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INTRODUCTION 
“I feel disconnected from myself at times.”  
“I feel like I am living someone else's memories.” 
-Park Lab study participants, 2014 
Weakened sense of self and anomalous bodily experiences were central to early theories 
of schizophrenia. When coining the word schizophrenia, Dr. Eugen Bleuler combined two Greek 
words that together mean “splitting of the mind.” Dr. Bleuler’s (1911) thorough clinical 
observations led him to believe that the fragmentation of the self and the disintegration of 
cognitive, emotional, and social functions are at the core of schizophrenia. Although these 
disturbances of the self are still recognized, contemporary researchers rarely consider them 
central to schizophrenia symptomatology, and clinicians seldom target self-disturbances for 
treatment (see Nasrallah, 2012). However, there has been a steady increase in awareness of the 
importance of self-disturbances in schizophrenia (see Park & Nasrallah, 2014), triggering a shift 
back to Bleuler’s early conceptualization of the disorder (Parnas & Handest, 2003). These recent 
efforts have led to the inclusion of distortions of the self-experience as one of eight core 
symptoms of schizophrenia in the forthcoming revision of the International Classification of 
Diseases-11 (Gaebel, 2017).  
But what is meant by distortions of self experiences? Before we can empirically 
investigate the disrupted sense of self in schizophrenia, it is necessary to clarify the 
conceptualization of the self and self disturbances. The  concept of “self” is complex and 
multilayered. Over the course of human history, vast efforts have been extended by philosophers, 
scientists, theologians, historians, and social scientists to clarify the concept of the self (see Hunt, 
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2015 for the history). Given the difficulties inherent to studying  the elusive concept of self, the 
studies presented here will be deliberately constrained to the domains that render non-
tautological definitions and where there is a broad agreement. At present, it is accepted that there 
are at least two levels at which selfhood is experienced: the minimal self and the narrative self 
(Nelson et al., 2014). The minimal self, also referred to as the “basic” self or “ipseity,” is thought 
to be pre-reflexive. It is the level at which the implicit first-person experience occurs. Ipseity 
gives rise to the “Self” as an invariant subject through which the world is perceived and lived. 
The minimal self is the most primal and foundational level of selfhood from which higher levels 
stem (Parnas, 2003). Through repeated experience and embodiment, we reach the explicit self-
awareness characteristic of higher levels of selfhood. One of these “higher” levels—the narrative 
self— binds together various aspects of personality, personal history, and social experiences to 
build a stable sense of self. The narrative self gives rise to a self-concept: an individual’s beliefs 
about themselves that influences their interactions with others and determines their self-identity 
(Baumeister, 1999). Figure 1 illustrate the multilayered construct of selfhood.  
 
FIGURE 1. Levels of Selfhood 
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Both first-person accounts of schizophrenia (Kean, 2009) and empirical studies of the 
phenomenology of the disorder suggest that the self is a core feature of schizophrenia (Parnas et 
al., 2005; Nelson et al., 2012). Sass and Parnas (2003), proposed the “Ipseity-Disturbance Model 
of schizophrenia” (IDM). The IDM conceptualizes disturbances of the minimal self as both 
central to the phenomenology of schizophrenia and critical to its onset (Sass & Parnas, 2003). 
Disturbances of the minimal self in schizophrenia are well documented in mechanisms such as 
agency (Hauser et al., 2011), mismatch negativity (Randeniya et al., 2018), corollary discharge 
(Thakkar et al., 2015), and multisensory integration (Postmes et al., 2014). To understand the 
extent and variety of minimal self-disturbances in schizophrenia, Parnas and his colleagues 
(2005) developed the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experiences (EASE), a semi structured 
interview assessing IDM. Findings from the EASE repeatedly point at minimal self-disturbances 
as specifically characteristic of schizophrenia, already present in those at-risk for psychosis, and 
predicting overall outcome in individuals with schizophrenia (Nelson et al., 2014). 
If the minimal, pre-reflexive self-disturbances highlight the importance of implicit bodily 
sense of self, disturbances at the narrative level represent disruption of the explicit, conscious, 
continuous sense of self (Mishara et al., 2014). In schizophrenia, the narrative self has been 
studied most extensively with respect to autobiographical memory impairments (McLeod et al., 
2006). Robinson and Taylor (1998) argue that access to autobiographical memories is essential 
for individuals to create an identity, which is in turn key to a stable sense of self. Two studies 
directly investigated narrative identity in schizophrenia and found that patients had difficulty 
organizing memories and extracting meaning from them, which resulted in difficulty creating a 
coherent personal narrative and self-identity (Raffard et al., 2010; Berna et al., 2011). 
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Although individuals with schizophrenia routinely display both minimal and narrative 
self-disturbances, the etiology of such disturbances has not been extensively investigated. Nelson 
and colleagues (2012) found that basic self-disturbances predicted transition to psychosis in ultra 
high risk individuals, suggesting that disruptions in the minimal self might pre-date other 
symptoms of schizophrenia. However, less is known about the onset of narrative self-
disturbances in the schizophrenia spectrum. Because the minimal self is the foundational level on 
which the narrative self is built, early disturbances of the minimal self in prodromal individuals 
may lead to disturbances of the narrative self in people with chronic schizophrenia. Roe and 
Davidson (2005) indeed argue that the self-disturbances associated with schizophrenia result in 
social and personal deficits making it difficult to create a coherent life narrative. In other words, 
the altered conscience of the bodily-self coupled with a fragmented identity observed in 
prodromal individuals may result in the disturbances of the narrative self and social deficits 
repeatedly endorsed by people with schizophrenia.  
In healthy populations, emotional experiences and awareness of  physiological sensations 
play a key role in the formation of autobiographical memories. The ability to create and recall 
accurate memories, in turn, is necessary to develop a sense of identity and acquire adequate 
social skills. Individuals with schizophrenia routinely demonstrate disturbances in all of the 
above: weakened sense of self, anomalous bodily experiences, and impaired autobiographical 
memory. We investigate this interplay and its resulting ramifications on social functioning for 
this population.  
The junction of the minimal self and the narrative self, and the crucial role of bodily 
sensations of emotions in forming the “Self” motivated our research. We believe that the bodily 
sensation of emotions lies at the intersection of the minimal self and the narrative, social self. 
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Embodied emotions refer to a phenomenological experience where perception or recollection of 
emotional signals leads to perceptual, somatovisceral, and motor re-experiencing of the 
corresponding emotional state. Thinking about an emotion activates the autonomic nervous 
system in a similar fashion as actively experiencing that emotion (Levenson, 2003). This 
suggests that bodily self-awareness and autobiographical memory affect our ability to physically 
experience emotions. Furthermore, the somatomotor simulation and re-enacting of emotions may 
allow us to plan for action, facilitate adaptive behavior, and support interpersonal interactions 
(Decety & Jackson, 2004; Niedenthal 2007; Keysers et al. 2010).  Additional functions of 
embodied emotions are linked to social cognition and functional outcome. In sum, embodied 
emotions rely on perception of bodily sensations and facilitates social functioning. 
The process by which one perceives internal bodily sensations is known as interoception. 
The construct of interoception is divided into different dimensions including “interoceptive 
accuracy,” which refers to an individual’s objective performance on a interoception task, and 
“interoceptive awareness,” which characterizes one’s ability to consciously interpret the bodily 
signals that arises from their physiological states (Cameron, 2001; Garfinkel et al., 2015). 
Greater interoceptive awareness is associated with improved emotion reappraisal (Füstös et al., 
2013) and higher strength of neural response to emotional stimuli (Pollatos et al., 2005).  
The “shared network” hypothesis suggests that brain regions recruited during the 
processing of one’s own emotional experiences are also involved in the processing of the 
emotional experiences of others (Singer, 2006). Thus, our ability to infer the emotional states of 
others stems from our capacity to internally simulate and re-create the bodily states of others. 
This suggests that decreased awareness of the bodily sensations of emotions in oneself might be 
associated with difficulty recognizing emotions in others. Previous studies have found disrupted 
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interoceptive capacity in people with schizophrenia (Ardizzi et al., 2016).  According to “shared 
network” hypothesis, this disrupted interoceptive ability in the context of emotions could 
contribute to the poor social functioning of individuals with schizophrenia. This hypothesis 
offers a framework for understanding how hypothesized anomalous physiological sensations of 
emotions may lead to disturbances of the narrative self and broad social impairments. 
Together, these previous results suggest that basic self-disturbances, such as impaired 
interoception, may lead to altered bodily sensation of emotions in schizophrenia. The literature 
also emphasizes that autobiographical memory deficits are central to narrative self-disturbances 
in schizophrenia. Autobiographical memory requires the ability to mentally recreate the 
affective, somatovisceral, and motoric context of an episode. These memories thus require 
adequate interoceptive awareness and emotional embodiment during the event. However, both 
interoception and emotional experience are altered in schizophrenia, potentially resulting in 
lowered ability to create a stable narrative identity from autobiographical memories. 
Bodily/self-disturbances and anomalous emotional functioning, both core features of 
schizophrenia, play a major role in social and functional outcome (Hooker & Park, 2002; Strauss 
& Herbener, 2011; Kring & Ellis, 2013). Much has been written about abnormal perception and 
expression of emotions in schizophrenia but less is known about the bodily experience of 
emotions in this population. Considering the prevalence of anomalous self and bodily 
experiences (Parnas & Handset, 2003) and interoception deficits (Ardizzi et al., 2016) in 
schizophrenia, it seems likely that the embodiment of emotions might be severely affected in this 
population. However, contemporary researchers have neglected the study of the bodily sensation 
of emotions in this population, thus ignoring this fundamental aspect of emotional experience. 
The first aim of this project was to directly study the bodily sensation of emotions in 
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schizophrenia. Given findings of bodily/self-disturbances and impaired emotion functioning in 
schizophrenia, we hypothesized that people with schizophrenia would have anomalous bodily 
sensations of emotions.  
We then investigated disturbances of varying levels of selfhood in high risk individuals to 
shed light on the onset of self-disturbances in the schizophrenia spectrum. Our second aim was to 
gain insight on the etiology of such symptoms in schizophrenia. Given findings of minimal self-
disturbances in prodromal individuals (Nelson et al., 2014) and evidence that emotional 
embodiment relies on the minimal self to create the narrative self, we hypothesized that high risk 
individuals would show evidence of interoceptive deficits and anomalous bodily embodiment but 
largely intact narrative identity. 
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STUDY 1. THE STRANGER WITHIN: ABNORMAL BODILY SENSATION OF 
EMOTIONS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 
 
 
Bodily-self disturbances and emotional deficits are central to schizophrenia. Importantly, 
bodily states and emotional experiences are linked via embodied emotions. Emotional 
embodiment relies on our bodily awareness and allows us to understand the affective states of 
others, therefore essential to social functioning. Anomalous embodied emotions could contribute 
to the disrupted sense of self and poor functional outcome of individuals with schizophrenia. In 
this study, we directly examined emotional embodiment in schizophrenia. We hypothesized that 
people with schizophrenia would have anomalous bodily sensations of emotions. 
 
Method 
Overview  
Participants completed a questionnaire for demographic information and a computerized 
task in which they colored bodily regions where they felt a change in activity in the context of 
different emotions. Subjects also completed standard metrics assessing cognitive ability and 
schizophrenia symptomatology. Protocols were approved by Vanderbilt University Institutional 
Review Board and participants gave written informed consent to participate in the study. 
 
Participants 
Participants’ demographic and clinical characteristics are summarized in Table 1. Fifty-
two participants completed the study, half who met the DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia (SZ; 
mean age= 46.1± 8.5, 12 females), and half healthy controls (CO; mean age= 40.9 ± 11.9, 10 
females) matched for age (t(50) = -1.81, p = 0.08) and gender (χ2 = 0.08, p = 0.78.) Diagnosis 
was established by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 2002). All 
 	
	
9	
patients were clinically stable at the time of assessment and taking antipsychotic medication 
administered in a standard dose. SZ symptoms were rated using the Brief Psychiatric Rating 
Scale (BPRS; Overall & Gorham, 1962), the Scale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; 
Andreasen, 1984), and the Scale for Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS; Andreasen, 
1983). Schizotypy was assessed in CO using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire, Brief 
(SPQ-B, Raine & Benishay, 1995). All participants provided written informed consent after 
procedures had been fully explained and were compensated at a rate of $20 per participation 
hour and reimbursed for travel expenses. 
TABLE 1. Demographic and clinical information for Study 1 participants 
 
 SZ (N=26)              CO (N=26)  
Characteristic       Mean       SD  Mean      
                
SD 
Gender (M/F) 14/12 - 16/10 - 
Age (years) 46.12 8.49 40.92 11.91 
Education (years)* 13.31 2.11 15.27 2.07 
Estimated IQa 102.81 8.82 110.31 6.72 
Medication (mg/day)b 287.67 217.91   
SAPS score 19.00 15.96   
SANS score 29.12 12.39   
BPRS score  17.31 7.58   
SPQ-B   
 
 
     Total score   
4.96 4.63 
     Perceptual/cognitive subscale   
1.42 1.53 
     Interpersonal subscale   
2.54 2.45 
     Disorganized subscale   1.00 1.47  
a Based on the North American Adult Reading Test. 
b All patients were medicated. Antipsychotic dosage was converted to chlorpromazine (CPZ) equivalent 
following guidelines provided by Andreasen et al. (2010). 
* Participants in the CO group had significantly more years of educations than those in the SZ group, 
t(50) = -3.38, p = 0.002. 
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Procedure 
After signing consent, participants provided background information (age, gender, race, 
handedness, education, relationship status, weight and height, and medication). Emotion 
embodiment data were then acquired using the EmBODY tool (Nummenmaa et al., 2014; 
http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/sohee/embody/v1/).In this task (see Figure 2), participants 
were shown two ventral views of human silhouettes and an emotion word. The silhouettes were 
abstract and two-dimensional to lower the cognitive load of the task. Participants were asked to 
read the emotion word and use the mouse to color the bodily regions whose activity they felt 
increasing (on the left body) or decreasing (on the right body) when experiencing each emotion. 
This process was repeated for thirteen emotion categories (anger, fear, disgust, happiness, 
sadness, surprise, anxiety, love, depression, contempt, pride, shame, and jealousy) and a neutral 
condition. Emotion words were used instead of emotional stimuli because Nummenmaa et al. 
(2014) previously found that both techniques resulted in concordant maps. 
 
FIGURE 2. The EmBODY tool 
Participants used a computer mouse to color bodily regions whose activity they feel becoming stronger 
(left body) or weaker (right body) in the context of a specific emotion (i.e. fear). There was no time limit 
for the task. 
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Results 
 
Data Analysis  
The analysis stream was similar to that of Hietanen et al. (2016) and was adjusted for 
small samples. Pre-processing consisted of manually screening individual maps for anomalous 
coloring (e.g., writing on the body or random scribbling) and masking responses outside the 
silhouettes. 
We first generated mean emotion-wise body maps for SZ and CO. Because violations of 
normality were observed for the embodiment scores, nonparametric analyses were implemented. 
To obtain group maps, we took frequency counts for the number of participants choosing 
activation only, and the number of participants choosing deactivation only for each pixel, for 
each emotion. These counts were then divided by the total number of participants in the group, 
creating proportions. For a given pixel and emotion, these two proportions were partitioned 
across two matrices, each showing the 50,364 pixels by 14 emotions. The two matrices were then 
combined into one final matrix, accounting and correcting for directionality. This final matrix of 
values from -1 to 1, corresponding to the blue-red color continuum, was used to generate the 
group map. The maps were thresholded at p < 0.05, FDR corrected. This nonparametric method 
is illustrated in Appendix A.  In these emotional bodily sensation maps, warm colors represent 
bodily activation while cold colors show bodily deactivation. We conceptualize “embodiment” 
as both activation and deactivation, representing a single continuum.  
To test whether different emotions are associated with statistically different bodily 
sensations in each group, we implemented statistical pattern recognition with linear discriminant 
analysis (LDA).  To estimate classification accuracy scores, we used stratified 126-fold cross-
validation where we trained the classifier to recognize all emotions against all others (complete 
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classification). The cross-validation scheme was run iteratively 100 times to yield standard 
deviations of the classification accuracy scores. To obtain significance thresholds for observed 
accuracy scores, we generated random data emulating the structure of observed data and 
analyzed it with the same LDA process. We then calculated the mean and variance of the 
resulting random empirical distribution, compared actual data to this random distribution, and 
obtained significance thresholds from these comparisons. 
To obtain similarity scores for maps between groups, we first averaged each emotion 
condition map within-group, giving 14 mean maps per group. Our data followed an exponential 
distribution, Spearman rank correlations were therefore computed for each vector of embodiment 
scores. To correct for multiple testing, a FDR correction was applied. This process yielded a 
correlation coefficient per emotion, quantifying the similarity between the topographical map of 
an emotion between two groups. Hietanen et al. (2016) computed the normalized Euclidean 
distance (NED) between both groups to generate similarity scores for each emotion condition. 
Because emotion conditions are represented as vectors rather than matrices, we used correlations 
instead of NED. To ensure the validity of this method, we computed similarity scores using both 
NED and Spearman correlations and found a direct linear relationship between each set of 
scores. In the interest of parsimony, we report Spearman correlation coefficients as a measure of 
similarity scores. 
Results 
Figure 3 shows the bodily sensation maps associated with each emotion for the CO and 
SZ groups. In both groups, the emotions are associated with distinct distributions of body areas 
where activity was felt to change. In the CO group, the uniqueness of the emotion maps is more 
evident and in accordance with previous results (Nummenmaa et al., 2014), whereas the maps of 
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the SZ group show more similarity across emotions including (e.g. activation in the head and 
chest across emotions).  
 
 
FIGURE 3: Bodily topography of emotions in CO and SZ 
 
Topographical maps of bodily sensations associated with 13 emotions and a neutral state in for the CO 
sample (top) and SZ sample (bottom). The maps show bodily regions whose activation increased (warm 
colors) or decreased (cool colors) when experiencing each emotion. The color bar indicates the t-statistic 
range. The maps were FDR corrected at p <0.05. 
 
 
 
The classification, linear discriminant analysis (LDA) confirmed the independence of 
body maps across emotions in the CO group only. The overall prediction accuracy was higher for 
CO than SZ (see Figure 4). Average classification accuracy exceeded chance level (0.07) 
significantly in CO (0.11, p<0.01) whereas it was below chance level in SZ (0.09, p>0.05). To 
replicate Hietenan et al.’s (2016) original method, we included all 14 emotion conditions as 
separate categories, which explains de low prediction accuracy scores reported here. 
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*	
 
* p< 0.01 
FIGURE 4: Overall classification accuracy in SZ and CO 
Mean (+/- SD) overall classification accuracy per group. The dashed horizontal line denotes chance level 
(0.07). 
 
The maps showed in Figure 3 also suggest as specific deficit in bodily deactivation in the 
context of emotions in the SZ group, evidenced by the lack of cold colors. This observation was 
quantitatively confirmed by computing Spearman correlations for the map of each emotion for 
the SZ and CO group. We found the highest correlations between the maps of SZ and CO among 
high arousal emotions (love rs=0.51, p<0.001; pride rs =0.49, p<0.001; fear rs =0.43, p<0.001) 
while the maps for some low-arousal emotions had correlations close to zero (sadness rs = -0.01, 
p=0.11; depression rs = -0.08, p<0.001). We note that although the correlations between the 
maps of SZ and CO are strongly significant for high arousal emotions (p<0.001), their effect 
sizes are in the moderate range (0.43 < rs < 0.51). This discrepancy between significance and size 
of the observed effect can be explained by the large number of observations (N=50,364 pixels) 
used to compute each correlation coefficient. We are therefore careful in interpreting the 
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magnitude of the relationship between the maps of SZ and CO and rather focus our subsequent 
discussion of similarity scores on the general trend observed. Figure 5 shows the similarity 
between emotion-wise bodily sensation of SZ and CO. 
 
FIGURE 5: Similarity between the emotion-wise bodily sensation of SZ and CO 
 
Discussion 
Using a novel body mapping tool, we showed that people with schizophrenia experience 
abnormal physiological sensation of emotions. The anomalous topographical pattern of emotions 
was evidenced by qualitatively different maps as well as less discrete and less specific bodily 
sensations across emotions in individuals with schizophrenia as compared to healthy controls. 
The bodily maps of our patient group revealed strong physiological similarities across emotions, 
including increased activity in the head. Although our data cannot resolve the specific 
mechanism linking schizophrenia symptomatology and bodily sensation, it is possible that the 
activation of the head consistently reported in our patient sample illustrates physiological 
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sensations associated with auditory hallucinations or disrupted cognition (i.e. delusions) rather 
than emotion-specific bodily sensation.  
 The low similarity score between the control and schizophrenia maps of low-arousal 
emotions suggests a specific deficit in embodiment of low-arousal emotions in our schizophrenia 
patients. Low-arousal emotions are primarily embodied as bodily deactivation in our healthy 
sample and prior cross-cultural studies (Nummenmaa et al., 2014), we therefore interpret this 
result as a specific deficit is bodily deactivation in emotional embodiment in schizophrenia. In 
understanding this finding, we turn to accounts of increased self-reported arousal in response to 
neutral stimuli in individuals with schizophrenia which might reflect a higher state of arousal at 
rest in individuals with schizophrenia (Llerena et al., 2012). Such a heightened baseline arousal 
could explain the difficulty in embodying low-arousal emotions in this population. 
 Because the EmBODY task inherently relies on the ability of an individual to recall 
emotional experiences, our finding of anomalous bodily sensation of emotions in patients is 
intrinsically tied to the autobiographical memory deficits experienced by this population. 
However, the link between autobiographic memories and embodied emotions remains unclear. 
The anomalous topographical sensation of emotions could result from disturbances of the 
minimal self previously described, and lead to difficulty recalling personal events. Indeed, the 
inability to properly embody emotional experiences could result in difficulty with mental 
somatomotor simulation and re-enacting of emotions, thus impacting an individual’s ability to 
access personal memories. However, our data does not allow to draw such causal conclusions. In 
Study 2, we will examine basic self-mechanisms and autobiographical memory in individuals at 
risk for psychosis to understand the emergence of self-disturbances in the schizophrenia 
spectrum. 
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To understand the clinical implication of our results, we again turn to the “shared-
network” hypothesis (Singer, 2006). If awareness of embodied emotions facilitates accurate 
perception of other people’s emotional states, our finding of deficits in emotional embodiment in 
schizophrenia could have important clinical applications. Clinicians may be able to improve the 
social functioning of patients by training their ability to detect and identify their own 
physiological emotional experiences. Meditation and mindfulness-based therapies already show 
promise for improving interoception and bodily awareness (Khalsa et al., 2008), as well as 
changing the functioning of the neural network associated with interoceptive awareness (Farb et 
al., 2012; Hölzel et al., 2007; Lazar et al., 2005).  
To our knowledge, the present study serves as the first self-report account of 
dysfunctional embodied emotions in schizophrenia. Previous studies have shown a disconnect of 
internal state and awareness in this population (Peterman et al., 2015). When asked to self-report 
their arousal in response to emotional stimuli, patients and controls did not significantly differ in 
their ratings although decreased galvanic skin response and heart beat were observed in 
schizophrenia (Peterman et al., 2015).  Through the bodily mapping of their emotions, people 
with schizophrenia could non-verbally communicate the decreased physiological arousal in 
response to emotional stimuli previously measured. This finding reveals EmBODY as a useful 
tool to study emotional experience in clinical populations for which verbal self-report measures 
have proven inconclusive. Body mapping helped resolve the mismatch between measured and 
reported bodily sensation of emotions in schizophrenia (Peterman et al., 2015). However, the 
results reported here cannot disentangle whether the self-reported embodiment deficits 
(specifically for low-arousal emotions) match the physiological deficits measured in people with 
schizophrenia. Future work should aim at mapping the actual physiological changes during 
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experimentally induced emotions. These physiological data could then be used to correlate the 
self-reported bodily sensations and the underlying physiological activity during emotions 
experiences in schizophrenia. 
There are a few limitations to our study. First our schizophrenia patients were chronically 
medicated. Known side effects of antipsychotic medications include emotional numbness and 
social withdrawal (Moritz et al., 2013). In other words, medications effects could underlie some 
of the reported deficits in embodied emotions. The current study does not allow to disentangle 
medication effects from schizophrenia phenomenology in anomalous embodied emotions. 
Secondly, we did not control for previous exposure to computer technology. Although to our 
knowledge there are no comprehensive reviews of technology usage in schizophrenia, the high 
prevalence of unemployment and poverty in this population raises the possibility that our 
schizophrenia patients had less experience with computer technology than our control subjects. If 
our schizophrenia patients had no or limited previous exposure to technology, some of the 
embodiment deficits observed here could be due to difficulty properly using technology during 
the EmBODY task. Finally, the EmBODY tool did not include trial or control items to ensure 
that participants understood the task. We introduce such validity items in Study 2. 
To conclude, we believe that the altered bodily sensation of emotions experienced by 
people with schizophrenia reported here may lay at the intersection of the disturbances of the 
minimal self and the altered sense of narrative identity experienced by this population. We now 
turn to individuals at risk for psychosis to investigate the etiology of self-disturbances in 
schizophrenia 
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STUDY 2. BASIC AND NARRATIVE SELF-DISTURBANCES IN THE 
SCHIZOPHRENIA SPECTRUM 
 
 
Past studies have almost exclusively relied on phenomenological self-report or interview 
measures to document bodily self-disturbances in schizophrenia. Study 1 provides new empirical 
evidence for the existence of bodily self-disturbances in schizophrenia that goes beyond 
phenomenology. However, we cannot rule out the potential impact of medication or illness 
duration in chronic patients with schizophrenia. One way to address these limitations is to 
examine healthy individuals who may share latent liabilities for schizophrenia. These people 
may be at risk for developing the disorder but are not medicated and are not ill. Therefore, in 
Study 2, we recruited individuals who may be at elevated risk for schizophrenia and matched 
control participants to examine embodiment of emotion and extend the study to another level of 
selfhood experiences. Emotional embodiment, which we found to be altered in schizophrenia, 
lies at the intersection of the two levels at which selfhood is experienced (the minimal self and 
the narrative self).  
In Study 2,  we examined high risk individuals to gain insight on the chronology and 
etiology of these self-disturbances in the schizophrenia spectrum. To test our hypothesis that 
minimal self-disturbances are followed by disturbances in emotional embodiment which later 
lead to a disturbances of the narrative identity, we examined interoceptive ability, emotional 
embodiment, and autobiographical memory in two samples of young adults at varying degree of 
risk for schizophrenia. We hypothesized that high risk individuals would show evidence of 
interoceptive deficits and anomalous bodily embodiment but largely intact narrative identity. 
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Method 
Participants 
Fifty-nine participants were recruited from Vanderbilt University. Exclusion criteria 
included prior history of neurological disorder or prolonged drug use. All participants provided 
written informed consent after receiving full explanation of the procedures, and received 
compensation through credits towards fulfillment of a psychology course requirement. 
Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board approved the protocols.  
The Prodromal Questionnaire, Brief Version (PQ-B; Loewy & Cannon, 2010) was used 
to create two sub-groups reflecting level of risk for psychosis. Detailed information on the PQ-B 
is provided in the following section. According to the guidelines provided by Loewy and 
colleagues (2011), the distress score of six was used as the cutoff for participants placed in the 
high risk for psychosis (HR) group. Participants with a distress score of zero or one were 
included in the low risk for psychosis (LR) group, which yielded equivalent sample sizes in both 
groups: 16 in the HR group and 17 in the LR group. Subjects in the HR and LR groups were 
demographically matched for age (t(31) = -0.62, p = 0.54), and gender (χ2 = 0.31, p = 0.58).  
Table 2 summarizes the participants’ demographic and sub-clinical characteristics. 
 
TABLE 2. Demographic and sub-clinical information for Study 2 participants 
 
 HR (N= 16)              LR (N= 17)  All (N= 59) 
 
Characteristic     Mean 
      
SD Mean      
                    
SD Mean     SD 
 
Age (years) 19.88 1.50 19.59 1.12 19.69 1.27 
 Gender (M/F) 3/13        –      2/15              –    10/40          – d 
PQ-B endorsed* 8.63 4.43 1.77 1.64 4.93 4.36  
PQ-B distress* 17.81 9.85 0.88 0.86 8.23 10.10  
SPQ-B        
     Total score* 9.81 5.05 5.29 3.08 7.44 4.49  
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     Perceptual/cognitive subscale* 3.25 2.12 1.35 1.22 2.41 1.95  
     Interpersonal subscale* 3.93 2.24 2.24 1.44 2.88 2.16  
     Disorganized subscale 2.63 1.93 1.70 1.61 2.15 1.69  
*Significant group difference between HR and LR  
 
Procedure 
Participants first gave written informed consent. They then completed all experimental 
measures described below in one session lasting about two hours. The order of task 
administration was counterbalanced across participants. 
Tasks  
Body mapping of emotions. The general data acquisition procedure for emotional 
embodiment is the same as previously laid out for Study 1 (see p.10).  However, we made two 
changes to the EmBODY tool. To investigate the topographical mapping of stress and loneliness 
(social emotions that may be specifically relevant to college students), we adjusted the original 
version of the EmBODY tool by replacing surprise and contempt with loneliness and stress, 
respectively. To ensure that participants understood the task, we also asked them to color in the 
maps of two common and localized bodily sensations serving as “control” items: migraine and 
nausea (http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/sohee/embody/v3/).  
Autobiographical memory. Singer and Moffitt’s (1991) Self-Defining Memory (SDM) 
questionnaire was used. The SDM questionnaire prompts participants to write about three 
autobiographical memories that define them. A self-defining memory was characterized as: (1) 
being at least one-year old, (2) being clearly remembered and feeling important, (3) dealing with 
an enduring theme, issue, or conflict in the individual’s life, (4) being linked to other similar 
memories, (5) leading to strong feelings, and (6) being thought about many times (Singer & 
Moffitt, 1991). For each memory, the participant wrote a caption to identify the event, described 
the memory including “details that could help an imaginary friend see and feel what [the subject] 
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lived (i.e. where the event took place, who was present, what happened, and how did [the 
subject] and others react to the event)”, and indicated the level of positive and negative emotions 
felt while recalling the memory on a 7-point Likert scale. Participants’ memories were scored on 
two criteria: specificity, and meaning-making. The scoring criteria for specificity and meaning-
making was taken from Singer & Blagov’s (2001) Classification System and Scoring Manual for 
Self-Defining Autobiographical Memories. Specificity was defined as a unique occurrence that 
lasted less than one day, each memory received a specificity score of 0 or 1. If a participant did 
not explicitly attach meaning to a memory in this way, meaning-making was scored as not 
present. This created a binary measure of meaning-making such that each memory received a 
score of 0 or 1. Memories were used as the unit of analysis for specificity and meaning-making. 
The word counts of each memory were also recorded. 
Working Memory and Verbal Ability. Working memory and verbal ability were measured 
to assess possible between-group differences in factors that could affect performance on the 
autobiographical memory task. Working memory was measured using the Letter-Number 
Sequencing (LNS) test (Keefe et al., 2006). In this task, participants are orally presented with 
sequences of numbers and letters and asked to repeat them starting with the numbers from 
smallest to biggest, followed by the letters in alphabetical order. The total number of sequences 
correctly recalled was recorded and used as an index of participant’s working memory capacity. 
Verbal ability was assessed with the North American Adult Reading Test Revised (NART-R; 
Blair & Spreen, 1989) in which participants are asked to read 61 English words aloud. Each 
word was scored 0 or 1 based on the participant’s pronunciation. The number of words correctly 
pronounced was converted into a standardized score representing the participant’s verbal ability, 
following Blair and Spreen’s (1989) scoring guidelines. 
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 Heart Beat Counting Task. Interoceptive accuracy and awareness were measured using 
Schandry’s Heart Beat Counting Task (HBCT; 1981). Before beginning the task, the participant 
was asked to sit with their hands on their lap and their palms up to prevent facilitation of heart 
beat detection. During the HBCT, the participant was instructed to count the number of times 
their heart beat during a certain interval of time. After a practice trial, the task was repeated four 
times for time intervals of 33, 25, 41, and 17 seconds. While the subject counted their heart beat, 
their actual number of heart beats was recorded using a Bluetooth Polar H10 heartrate monitor 
and chest strap (Polar Electro Öy, Kempele, Finland). After each trial, the participant was 
instructed to rate the confidence of their heart beat count on a 1-10 Likert scale. Interceptive 
accuracy was computed at the trial level using the following transformation:  
(1-|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats|)/recorded heartbeats) (Schandry et al., 1981) 
Interoceptive accuracy scores ranged from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating less discrepancy 
between counted and recorded heartbeats, which therefore indicated higher interoceptive 
accuracy.  Interoceptive awareness was computed by calculating the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the interoceptive accuracy and the self-reported confidence rating at each 
trial (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Interoceptive awareness scores therefore also varied between 0 and 
1, with higher score indicating greater correspondence between interoceptive accuracy and 
confidence ratings, therefore indicating higher interoceptive awareness. 
 Self-report questionnaires. The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire, Brief (SPQ-B; 
Raine & Benishay, 1995) was administered to assess psychosis proneness. The SPQ-B is a 22-
item, true/false questionnaire consisting of cognitive-perceptual, interpersonal, and disorganized 
schizotypy factors. The Prodromal Questionnaire, Brief Version (PQ-B; Loewy & Cannon, 
2010) was administered to screen for psychosis risk. The PQ-B is a 21-item self-report 
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questionnaire comprised of positive symptom items and follow up questions regarding distress 
and impairment caused by the endorsed items. The distress score cutoff of six was shown to have 
the greatest sensitivity in identifying individuals at risk for psychosis (Loewy et al., 2011). This 
cutoff score was therefore used to create groups as previously mentioned. Participants also 
provided completed a demographic questionnaire providing background information (age, 
gender, race, handedness, education, relationship status, weight and height, and medication). 
 
Results 
Data Analysis  
HR and LR participants were used in the group-level analyses. All 59 participants 
recruited for this study were included in sample-wide analyses investigating the link between 
different measures of self-experience and the continuum of schizotypy.  
Bodily sensation of emotions. We employed the same method as the one used in Study 1 
to pre-process the data, generate emotion-wise body maps for each group, test the independence 
of the bodily sensation of each emotion, and obtain similarity scores between the groups (see pp. 
11-12).   
Interoceptive Accuracy and Awareness. Because no violation of normality or 
homogeneity of variance were observed, group differences in interoceptive accuracy and 
awareness were assessed using independent samples t-tests. Effect sizes were calculated using 
Cohen’s d.  Individual trials were used as the unit of analysis for interoceptive accuracy and 
subject was used as the unit of analysis for interoceptive awareness. Pearson’ correlations were 
conducted to evaluate the relation between interoception and schizotypy, and Holm corrections 
were applied to account for multiple testing.  
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Autobiographical Memory. Violations of normality were observed for both specificity 
and meaning-making scores. Therefore, group differences for these two measures were assessed 
using Mann-Whitney U tests. An independent samples t-test was used to compare the word count 
of memories in each group. For each memory, we subtracted the subject’s rating of negative 
feeling from their rating of positive feeling to yield a total feeling score per memory. We then 
labelled each memory as “positive” (positive total feeling score), “negative” (negative total 
feeling score) or “neutral” (total feeling score of 0) and analyzed these data using a chi –square 
test to assess group differences in emotions experienced when recalling self-defining memories.  
Finally, Spearman rank correlations were computed to evaluate the relationship between 
measures of self-defining memories and schizotypy in the whole sample and Holm corrections 
were applied.  
Working Memory & Verbal Ability. To test for between-groups differences in 
participant’s working memory capacity and verbal ability—factors possibly influencing 
autobiographical memory—we performed two independent-samples t-tests comparing HR and 
LR. 
 
Results 
Body mapping of emotions. Figure 6 shows the bodily maps of emotions across the whole 
sample. These maps reveal that emotions are associated with distinct distributions of changing 
activity across bodily areas in our sample of young adults. These maps are also highly 
concordant with those obtained from the CO group in Study 1, as well as previous cross-cultural 
results (Nummenmaa et al., 2014). Our two substitute emotions, stress and loneliness, were also 
associated with specific patterns of bodily sensations. Stress is experienced as an increase in 
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activity in the upper body, particularly the face and chest. Loneliness is felt as overall 
deactivation across the body, with some people reporting activation in the head. Finally, the 
embodiment of our two added “control” sensations (migraine and nausea) are precise, localized 
and reached a high level of agreement amongst participants, confirming the subjects’ 
understanding of the EmBODY task. 
 
 
FIGURE 6: Bodily topography of emotions in young adults 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the bodily sensation maps associated with each emotion for the LR and 
HR groups separately. The overall pattern on bodily sensation is similar between the HR and LR 
groups across emotions. However, the maps of the HR group show brighter and more localized 
sensations across different emotions (e.g. activation in the head and chest). HR also seem to 
report less deactivation in the context of low arousal emotions as compared to LR (e.g. sadness, 
loneliness). We observe good concordance in the HR and LR maps for the two control conditions 
(migraine and nausea), suggesting that participants in both groups understood the task.  
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FIGURE 7: Bodily topography of emotions in LR and HR 
 
The classification, linear discriminant analysis (LDA) confirmed the independence of 
body maps across emotions in both the HR and the LR groups. The overall prediction accuracy 
was higher for LR than HR (Figure 8). Average classification accuracy exceeded chance level 
(0.0625) significantly in both LR (0.093 p<0.01) and HR (0.089 p<0.01) although it was higher 
in LR.  
 
* p< 0.01 
FIGURE 8: Overall classification accuracy in LR and HR  
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Mean (+/- SD) overall classification accuracy per group. The dashed horizontal line denotes chance level 
(0.0625). 
 
 
Spearman correlations of the map of each emotion for the HR and LR groups revealed 
significant positive correlations across all emotions. We found the strongest correlations between 
the maps of HR and LR among high arousal emotions (disgust rs=0.82, p<0.001; stress rs =0.78, 
p<0.001; anger rs =0.75, p<0.001) while the maps of low-arousal emotions (depression rs = 0.20, 
p<0.001; sadness rs=0.23, p<0.001; loneliness rs=0.25, p<0.001) and the neutral condition 
(rs=0.20, p<0.001) were only weakly correlated. Due to the small effect sizes of these 
relationships, our discussion of similarity scores will again focus on general trends emerging 
rather than strength of the relationship between HR and LR maps for a given emotion condition.  
See Figure 9 for the similarity score between all emotion-wise bodily sensations of HR and LR. 
 
 
FIGURE 9: Similarity between the emotion-wise bodily sensation of LR and HR 
 
 
Interoception. A significant group difference was observed in interoceptive accuracy 
t(130)= -3.02, p = 0.003, d = 0.55,  with LR (M= 0.72, SD = 0.16) showing higher interoceptive 
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accuracy than HR (M= 0.63, SD = 0.17). No significant difference was found in interoceptive 
awareness between HR (M= 0.12, SD = 0.58) and LR (M= 0.18, SD = 0.55), t(31)= -0.30, p = 
0.77. These results are illustrated in Figure 10 below. 
 
   
*p< 0.05 
FIGURE 10: Difference in interoceptive accuracy and awareness between LR and HR 
 
 
  Table 3 summarizes the results of correlations between measures of interoception and the 
three subscales of schizotypy, computed on the whole sample. Interoceptive accuracy and 
interoceptive awareness were not found to correlate with psychosis-proneness. 
 
TABLE 3: Correlations between schizotypy subscales and measures of interoception  
 SPQ-B Interpersonal SPQ-B Disorganized SPQ-B Cognitive 
Interoceptive Accuracy -0.31+ -0.10 -0.13 
Interoceptive Awareness -0.10 -0.00 -0.07 
+p<0.1, *p<0.05 
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Autobiographical memory. There was no group difference in verbal ability or working 
memory capacity. HR (M=17.57, SD=2.75) and LR (M=18.5, SD=2.55) were closely matched in 
working memory (t(31)= -1.33, p = 0.19). Similarly, HR (M=113.18, SD=5.68) and LR 
(M=110.74, SD=6.30) did not differ in their verbal ability, t(31)= 0.90, p = 0.38.  Because no 
working memory or verbal ability differences were observed between HR and LR, these 
measures were not included as covariates in the following analyses.  
No group differences were found on measures of autobiographical memories between HR 
and LR. HR (M=2.13, SD=0.89) and LR (M=2.25, SD=0.93) did not differ in the number of 
specific memories they reported (U= 141, p = 0.6). Similarly, HR (M=1.25, SD=1.29) and LR 
(M=1.19, SD=1.22) did not differ in the number of meaning-making memories they recalled (U= 
124.5, p = 0.90). No difference was observed in the type of emotion experienced when recalling 
self-defining memories between HR (positive: 69%, neutral= 2%, negative= 29%) and LR 
(positive: 60%, neutral: 7%, negative: 33%), c2(2, N=32) = 1.42, p = 0.49. No difference was 
observed in the word count of memories produced by HR (M= 162.98, SD = 86.72) and LR (M= 
185.17, SD = 112.38), t(31) = -1.08, p = 0.28. 
Whole-sample analyses revealed a medium-effect size, negative relationship between the 
cognitive/perceptual subscale of schizotypy and specificity and length of autobiographical 
memories.  In particular, increased cognitive/perceptual schizotypy was significantly correlated 
with decreased specificity of self-defining (r = -0.32, p < 0.05) memories and decreased number 
of words used to report memories (r  = -0.31, p < 0.05) . Schizotypy was not related to the 
meaning-making quality of a memory or to the feelings experienced when recalling self-defining 
memories. See Table 4. 
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TABLE 4: Correlations between schizotypy subscales and measures of autobiographical memory 
across subjects  
 SPQ-B Interpersonal SPQ-B Disorganized SPQ-B Cognitive 
Feelings  -0.28+ -0.093 -0.074 
Specificity 0.017 -0.12 -0.32* 
Meaning-Making -0.072 -0.10 -0.038 
Word Count -0.18 -0.013 -0.31* 
+p<0.1, *p<0.05 
 
Discussion 
Using a variety of methods, we found evidence for the presence of minimal self-
disturbances in individuals at risk for schizophrenia, but there was no clear evidence for 
impairments of narrative self-disturbances in this population. Specifically, we observed 
diminished interoceptive accuracy, mildly anomalous bodily sensation of emotions, but intact 
narrative identity in young adults who may be at increased risk for psychosis. 
Using the EmBODY tool, we showed that individuals at risk for psychosis experience 
abnormal physiological sensation of emotions that mirror, to a lesser extent, those observed in 
our schizophrenia population in Study 1. Although the bodily maps of HR and LR individuals 
appeared qualitatively similar, the low similarity score between the maps of HR and LR for low-
arousal emotions suggests a specific deficit in embodiment of low-arousal emotions in our HR 
individuals, again similar to that found in people with schizophrenia in Study 1. The anomalous 
topographical pattern of emotions was also evidenced by the prediction accuracy analysis which 
revealed less discrete and less specific bodily sensations across emotions in HR as compared to 
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LR. Previous research revealed a linear developmental trajectory of emotional bodily sensations 
in healthy individuals, from more to less specific patterns as a function of age (Hietanen et al. 
2016). In the context of this previous finding, we interpret the present result as a failure to 
develop unique bodily sensations of specific emotions in individuals at risk for schizophrenia, 
which may stem from pre-existing disturbances of the minimal self  (Nelson et al., 2014), and 
could result in a disrupted narrative identity as well as social deficits later in life.  
The EmBODY tool is a self- report measure of emotional embodiment. Bodily maps 
obtained from this task therefore inherently rely both on the actual physical experience of 
emotions as well as awareness of these bodily sensations. In other words, the differences found 
between the bodily maps of HR and LR could illustrate diverging bodily sensations associated 
with emotions between the two groups, differences in interoception accuracy, or both. According 
to the “shared network” hypothesis, an individual physically experiencing emotions differently 
than others would have difficulty perceiving and understanding the affective states of others, 
which could lead to social impairments. Additionally, not being able to discern one’s own 
internal affective states may result in a fragmented sense of self. 
To understand possible mechanisms underlying the anomalous bodily sensation of 
emotions in HR, we examined a basic experience of the self: interoception.  As predicted, we 
found that interoceptive accuracy, a measure of sensitivity to physiological signals originating 
inside the body, was lower in people at high risk for psychosis compared to those at low risk. 
This finding mirrors that of studies investigating interoceptive accuracy in people with 
schizophrenia (Ardizzi et al., 2013). The present results therefore suggest that an impaired 
awareness of bodily signals, a basic and pre-reflexive self mechanism, may appear prior to the 
onset of psychosis and/or may be an endophenotypic marker for the schizophrenia spectrum. 
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These interoceptive impairments underlie the anomalous bodily sensations of emotions 
previously described. 
 Interestingly, interoceptive awareness did not differ between people at high risk for 
psychosis and those at low risk, revealing that pre-reflexive self-disturbances may be central to 
psychosis risk but not conscious awareness of interoception. To our knowledge, no study has 
investigated interoceptive awareness in individuals with schizophrenia. However, the 
metacognitive deficits well established in the schizophrenia literature (Gulmey et al. 2011; 
Lysaker et al., 2014) suggest that interoceptive awareness might be impaired in this population. 
We also found that interoceptive accuracy and awareness did not correlate with domains of 
schizotypy, suggesting that minimal self-disturbances are specific to individuals at risk for 
psychosis rather than linked to broadly conceptualized psychosis-proneness.  
No differences were found between the self-defining memories generated by individuals 
at high and low risk for developing psychosis, revealing intact narrative identity in prodromal 
individuals. Specifically, the memories reported in both group did not differ in specificity, 
meaning-making quality, or length. These results are in contrast with the well documented 
autobiographical memory deficits and disrupted narrative identity of individuals with 
schizophrenia. Using the SDM, Raffard and colleagues (2010) found deficits in specificity and 
meaning-making for the memories reported by people with schizophrenia as compared to those 
of matched controls. We interpret our finding of adequate narrative identity in HR individuals as 
evidence for the later onset of disturbances of the narrative self in people who do transition to 
psychosis. In other words, the disrupted sense of the social and narrative identity that 
characterizes the phenomenology of schizophrenia is not present in prodromal individuals. We 
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therefore suggest that psychotic experiences may contribute to disturbances of the narrative self 
in this population. 
An alternative hypothesis proposes that an anomalous chronological distribution of self-
defining memories in individuals with schizophrenia might underlie disturbances of their 
narrative identity. Previous studies have found evidence for the presence of an earlier 
“reminiscence bump” in individuals with schizophrenia (peaking at 15-19 years) compared to 
healthy individuals (peaking at 20-24 years) (Raffard et al., 2009). The literature reveals well-
established evidence that the reminiscence bump is essential to the development of a stable sense 
of narrative identity and that the timing of this reminiscence bump is critical to the nature of self- 
defining events (Conway, 2005; Rathbones, Moulin, & Conway, 2008). Because the age range of 
our sample was 18-22 years, we were not able to examine the reminiscence bump of our HR and 
LR groups. Our study therefore cannot attest for possible evidence of an early reminiscence 
bump in prodromal individuals. 
 In the whole-sample analyses we found a significant negative relationship between the 
cognitive subscale of schizotypy and the specificity and length of memories such that people 
who scored higher on the cognitive/perceptual subscale of schizotypy reported less specific and 
shorter self-defining memories. This finding aligns with that of non-specific self-defining 
memories in individuals with schizophrenia (Raffard et al., 2010), suggesting a tendency to 
report less specific autobiographic memories across the schizophrenia spectrum although not 
specific to individuals at risk for psychosis.  
Our findings are in line with those of Postmes and colleagues (2014) who described 
schizophrenia as a self-disorder due to perceptual incoherence, and argued that impairments of 
multisensory integration lead to incoherent conscious experiences of the self. Here, we found 
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that basic self-disturbances precede more complex ones. Our results suggest a similar sequential 
chain of self-disturbances in schizophrenia. Together, our findings suggest that basic bodily self 
mechanisms (e.g. interoception) are critical to our awareness of emotional bodily signals that 
help us understand others and create a sense of our own identity. Prodromal individuals already 
exhibit disturbances in some of the foundational levels of the sense of self. 
There are several limitations to this study. First, the sample size is small. Second, risk for 
psychosis was measured using a self-report questionnaire (PQB), the external validity of our HR 
group would increase if we used a collection of methodology to assess risk for psychosis. 
Furthermore, our cross-sectional study design does not allow us to draw any causal conclusion 
regarding the chronological order of onset of self-disturbances in the schizophrenia spectrum. A 
longitudinal design following people at risk for psychosis until they transition to psychosis (or do 
not) would be useful in confirming the developmental trajectory of disturbances of the self in 
schizophrenia. 
Overall, we found evidence for the presence of basic self-disturbances in individuals at 
risk for schizophrenia. We also found that these individuals experience mildly anomalous bodily 
sensation of emotions that mirror those observed in people with schizophrenia. However, we 
found no differences between the self-defining memories reported by individuals at high risk for 
schizophrenia compared to the memories recalled by those at low risk.  Emotional embodiment 
relies on pre-reflexive bodily mechanisms (i.e. interoception) and is essential to create a stable 
self-concept, as well as to understand the emotional states of others. In other words, we argue 
that the embodiment of emotions relies on mechanisms of the foundational basic self, and gives 
rise to the narrative, social self. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Building on the well-established phenomenological literature on the minimal self and 
narrative self-disturbances in schizophrenia, in Study 1 we found that individuals with 
schizophrenia also experience anomalous bodily sensation of emotions. This finding not only 
adds to the collection of bodily/self-disturbances experienced by this population but also bridges 
the gap between disrupted pre-reflective and conscious self. We believe that embodied emotions 
lie at the intersection of the minimal self and the narrative self. Emotional embodiment allows us 
to pre-reflexively reach a first-person emotional experience, which in turn helps us understand 
the emotional states of others.  
In Study 2, we investigated minimal self-disturbances (interoception), emotional 
embodiment, and disturbances of the narrative self (autobiographical memory) in healthy 
individuals who may carry latent liability for schizophrenia and matched controls. We found that 
interoceptive accuracy was impaired in individuals at risk for psychosis. We also found evidence 
for anomalies in emotional embodiment in the high risk group. However, the autobiographical 
memory of at-risk individuals was intact. The results of Study 2 suggest that the core minimal 
self-disturbances are present during the prodromal stage but there was no evidence of 
impairments of the narrative self in high risk individuals. Current study does not allow us to 
make inferences about the chronology of self disturbances across the schizophrenia spectrum but 
future longitudinal studies will be able to extend these findings. 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX A: Nonparametric method used to compute group maps. 
 
To account for small sample sizes, the proportion of endorsements was taken as the significance 
indicator for a given pixel. The final equation yielded the value of each pixel that was used to 
generate the map. Maps were then thresholded at p < 0.05, FDR corrected. 
 
